Downscalin' 2 - Electric Boogaloo (Hadejia-Nguru Wetlands: Part 2)

In the previous post, we established that there are precipitous effects of the Hadejia-Jama'are RBDA's hegemony, effects that are driving conflicts between local-level actors downstream. In this post, we'll identify some of these effects and discuss their real-world implications. First, though, we have to know how people make ends meet in the region.

Getting by in the Wetlands

Last time, I quickly summarised the main industries of the region (farming, fishing, livestock-rearing and material collection), and how these industries depend on the wetlands' resources. In this section, I will focus on the first two of these industries since around 3/4 Hadejia-Nguru locals are either fishermen (>50%) or farmers (~25%) (Ringim et al., 2015), although we will return to the other industries later.

Fishing has maintained its importance despite the risks lower species diversity and reduced flooding extent (ibid.). The invasion of Typha grass from East Africa is putting additional pressure on fishermen, making navigation and trapping increasingly difficult. Ayeni et al. (2019) suggest that fishing is the most lucrative regional industry, accounting for an estimated 40% of all regional income from resource-depleting activities.

As we've noted, irrigation agriculture is being intensified in the upstream lands, with a particular focus on cash-crops like wheat (Blench, 2013). This form of farming depends on (oft-illegal) channelisation and shallow aquifer exploitation, which are both detrimental to those downstream as they respectively deplete floodplain and groundwater resources. Rain-fed (tudu) and floodplain (fadama) agriculture are also performed, complementary to each other and supporting conjunctive resource use e.g. livestock grazing in the dry season (Thompson and Polet, 2000). Upland tudu farms cultivate subsistence crops such as millet and sorghum, whilst fadamas support rotations of 2-3 crops annually: rice in the wet season; groundnut, cowpeas or subsistence crops as flooding recedes, and vegetables (on irrigated lands) during the dry season. There are clear threats to these agricultural practices from climate change and altered floodplain hydrology. 

Pastoral Scenes

In light of upstream developments (impoundment/irrigation) and the subsequently shrinking floodplain, downstream demand for floodplain land has intensified. Rooted in this demand is one of the most prominent small-scale conflicts in the HNWs, between pastoralists (mostly the nomadic Fulani) and agriculturalists. In a 200-year tradition, pastoralists descend from the uplands in the dry season graze their cattle once their rain-fed pastures have been shed of grass (Thomas and Adams, 1999). In a tacit benefit-sharing arrangement, fadama farmers would offer their land for livestock grazing and, in return, profit from natural fertilisation. However, resource scarcity and the related introduction of chemical fertilisers to secure high-value harvests have changed the game. Agriculturalists are now reluctant to offer their lands to the pastoralists, charging them or barring them entirely (Blench, 2013). Pastoralists have a habit of encroaching on the fadamas without consent and damaging the crops. This has led to violent conflict breaking out between the two 'factions' (Adams, 1993), with pastoralists feeling that they are entitled to continue the tradition of grazing on those pastures.

A Fulani herdsman with his cattle
Wikicommons (Amkaja)

Failing to access the fadamas and lacking alternative options, livestock herders have sometimes resorted to trespassing into protected areas and engaging in fighting with the guards. Blench (2013) classifies this as a conflict of access rights between citizens and authorities. The example above represents an inter-society conflict, between different groups of citizen actors. We might also see a society-internal conflict between pastoralists themselves, particularly between different people groups or between established and newer herders, vying for their share of the diminishing resource pool.

Looking Ahead

Don't get the wrong impression from my fixation on pastoralists; they are not out to cause more trouble than other local actors, their conflicts are simply better documented. On the citizen vs authorities level, fishermen and small-scale farmers have trespassed onto protected areas to exploit their resources (Kaugama and Ahmed, 2014; Ringim et al., 2015). The collection of doum palm and firewood, two commercially valuable natural materials (FAO, 1997), might lead to conflicts of access of a similar nature (Blench, 2013). Doum palm collectors and cattle herders have been known to clash over the latter's cutting of palms to sustain their cattle. Conflict in the region is also suffering the effects of Islamism; Boko Haram recruiting jobless youths (Pearce, 2017) and forcing migration, and militants stoking the flames of inter-society conflicts by arming locals since the 90s (Blench, 2013). Indeed, this is a devastating feedback loop.

The truth is that, when resources are diminishing and governance is weak, local actors will act to secure their livelihood. In the absence of centralised downstream power, locals cannot fight back against the Hadejia-Jama'are RBDA's unilateralism, and since their concerns cannot be addressed from above, they are resigned to solve conflicts amongst themselves. Traditional authorities such as village elders and District Heads have been called upon as arbiters, but these rulings are highly variable (ibid.). For pastoralists, 'hospitality committees' have been formed to mediate agreements. Unfortunately, this is not enough. If things continue as they are, the same problems will occur again and again.

Plus, new conflicts may emerge. I mentioned the use of groundwater in upstream irrigation farming, but consider that climate change and damming combine to reduce groundwater recharge (Thompson and Polet, 2000). Will we soon reach a point where downstream households don't have secure access to safe water?