Trouble on the Nile - The Ugly (Part 2)

Today we will dive into the political consequences of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. A natural starting point here would be the colonial-era agreements that have heavily shaped the surrounding political landscape.

A history of hydro-hegemony

Egypt has a long history of hydro-hegemony over the Nile, a history dating back to the Ancient Egyptian civilisation, a birthchild of the river basin's fertile soils (Hassan, 1997). Over the centuries, the Nile evolved from a source of opportunity to a source of dependency. Many Egyptian rulers would centre their hydrological strategy solely around the Nile (Tekuya, 2020). This, of course, would have severe repercussions for the upstream neighbours, Ethiopia included.

Although Egypt became an independent nation in 1922, the British remained in its former territory over the subsequent decades, holding a firm grasp over the nation until the 1952 (Botman, 1991). Similarly, Sudan remained a British colony until January 1st 1956. We can definitively say that British influence muddied the proverbial waters of the Nile region, since several important treaties were spearheaded by the United Kingdom. As Ethiopia was never a British colony - and never colonised -  it was either excluded from or dealt an unfortunate hand in these treaties, with the UK flexing its ideological and economic muscle at the negotiating table (Carles, 2006).

British decolonisation in the Nile Basin
WikiCommons (Public Domain)

The first of said treaties was the 1902 agreement between Anglo-Sudan (Britain) and Ethiopia, which sought to draw a border between the two nations. It stated that Ethiopia could not make developments along the Blue Nile without Anglo-Sudanese approval. Ethiopia, surrounded by British territories and other colonial powers, had little say in this matter (Arsano and Tamrat, 2005). Next came the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement between Britain and Egypt, which allowed Egypt veto power over any construction project on the Nile. Not only did this cement Egypt's hegemonic position in the region, but it also established an enforceable legal framework that could arguably still be applicable today. Finally, three years after Sudan achieved its independence, it succeeded in pressuring Egypt into signing a new agreement that included them. The 1959 Agreement for Full Utilisation of Nile Waters afforded Sudan one-third of the water share of Egypt (18.5 vs. 55.5BCM), with evaporation losses accounting for the remaining 10BCM. This treaty, through its defined water allocations, closed off the Nile from upstream nations.

Reactions to the GERD

Following the first announcement of the dam's construction in 2011, it was unsurprisingly met with strong resistance by both Egypt and Sudan. Hosni Mubarak's position on Ethiopian Blue Nile infrastructure projects had long been clear, once stating that he would be prepared to drop a bomb on its neighbour (Arsano, 2007). His successor Mohamed Morsi continued this war rhetoric, saying in 2013 that 'all options are open' (BBC, 2013). Leaked emails from 2010 suggest that Egypt and Sudan had discussed the issue of military cooperation if Ethiopia were to announce a dam, with plans to construct a military airbase in Darfur (Business Insider, 2012). 

However, the paradigm has shifted from vehement opposition to reluctant acceptance, with the downstream nations now focusing their efforts on damage limitation (Yihdego et al., 2017). This started in 2012 when ex-Sudanese President al-Bashir announced that he would support the dam's construction after a meeting of the countries' water ministers. This pattern of reconciliation has continued beyond the his tenure; as indicated in the previous post, the GERD is set to bring important economic and energy benefits to Sudan that it would be foolish to turn down, especially in the context of 'oil-rich' South Sudan's 2011 secession (Tawfik, 2016). Sudan's move towards Ethiopia has also forced Egypt to change its position. It is moving away from Sudan as a strategic partner and towards South Sudan, having a military outpost near the capital Juba (Cascao and Nicol, 2016; Tawfik, 2016). Abandoned by its southern neighbour, Egypt went from blocking international funding and support for the project (Nasr and Neef, 2017) to politically engaging with Ethiopia over the timetable of the filling period (Mbaku, 2020).

The Present and the Future:

Whilst the three nations find themselves in gridlock over the filling period, Ethiopia's prerogative has not changed. Its impoundment decisions have, as we saw last time, agitated the political leadership downstream, but these moves continue to tip the regional power balance.

Historic treaties, particularly the 1959 agreement, created a zero-sum game, whereby upstream gains must create downstream losses (Arsano and Tamrat, 2005). With increasing climate variability in the Nile Basin, these zero-sum games are valuable constructions to Egypt and Ethiopia, as they try to secure their own water security (Verhoeven, 2021).

That said, whilst nationalism thrives off zero-sum games, all measures need to be taken to ensure that conflict does not break out, in light of ongoing instability in Tigray and Sudan. With Ethiopia set to announce more dams in the future (Tawfik, 2016), improved cooperation will be needed. Benefit-sharing could be the modus operandi.